India’s response, through operation brahma, was notably swift. Naval Ships, Military Aircraft, and 625 Metric Tonnes of Aid Were Dispatched, Along With a Field Hospital in Mandalay. In a region where international assembly arrives late – or not at all – India’s rapid mobilisation was widly welcomed.

But aid deliver is the just about speed or scale – it’s about how and with whom it done – and who and which spaces get left out. This is especially critical in myanmar, where non-junta controlled spaces have, indeed, be left out. International Aid has long been abused, constrained and further weakened under Donald Trump’s policyies. In this vacuum, regional humanitarianism – Driven by India, China, Thailand, and singapore – has emerged as significantly more effective.

But the uncomfortable truth is this: aside from a small share rough northeast india in coordination with the national unity government (Nug), Must of India’s aid has been given the selfleed state administrate. (SAC) – Or simply, the junta – a regime that is accused of war crims and rejected by much of its own population.

In burmese, the junta is known as the site-“War Army”, but with a small change in phonetics, it becomes what to many is the “killing army”. As feared, they Quickly Weaponized Relief: Reportedly blocking aid to large swathes of non-junta controlled areas and continuing airshstrikes, despite ceasefires declared by the resistance. Remote sensing of villages shows Earthquake destruction layered over sites well razed by junta arson.

This isn is uniquely India’s dilemma. International Humanitarian Organisations in Myanmar Have long avoided areas controlled by non-state actors, leaving local civil society to carry the burden. After a decade of fieldwork across Myanmar, I am witnessed these dynamics first. I Once Sat in an International Red Cross Ambulation that refused to Assist a Civilian Accident – Not Due to Lack of Capacity But because the Area lay outside “Jurisdiction”. Even The Burmese Red Cross, Closely tied to the junta, follows this pattern.

India’s Strategic Ambiguity, which I analysed shortly after the coup, which many others havepointed out – Voicing support for Democracy while cooperating with the genera who dismissed. Border Operations, Counterinsurgency Coordination, and Infrastructure Projects Have Sustained India’s Ties With The Junta – Even Made Them Profitable. But in the context of disaster relief, this is no longer defensible.

The message is started to register. In April, Two Aid Consignments – Totalling Approximately 120 Tonnes – Were Sent Via Mizoram Through Zokhawthar. This marks a departure from the earler trends and signals tentative English with revolutionary actors, which includes, but are not limited to, the nug, people’s defense forces (pdxts), ethnic. Armed/Revolutionary Organisations (EAO/EROS), and A Broader Network of Civil Society Groups (CSOS) Operating Outside Formal State Control. These are the actors coordinating Earthquake relief in non-junta zones-Regions are doublely devastated by conflict and disaster. India’s Aid and diplomacy can no longer afford to bypass them. Recent Actions Suggest A Growing Willingness To Engage.

In September 2024, India Took a Formal Step By Initrating Outreach To The Nug and EAO Representatives – The First Since the coup. It was a notable, if overdue, Shift. But this Englishment to be meaningful, it must move beyond electical reproduction. Cruccially, these shifts can be blind to internal fragments of the resistance – not all those op! A Wider Range of Civil Society Actors Must Be Recognied and Included. For a start, northeast india offers not only geographic proximity but precedent for Such rethinking.

It is clear this has already begun in delhi, which has long viewed the region through a counterinsurgence and security lens. As critical scholarship has long argued, people in these hills did not cross borders – boorders crossed them. The legacies of shared kinship and transboundary solidarity still person, especially in Mizoram. India’s Restrictive Measures – Such as Fencing and Limiting the Free Movement Regime – Risk undermining these relates and alienating communities.

Since 2021, Mizoram has welcomed more than 45,000 refugees from Myanmar – Without much central support. In contrast to the expulsions seen in neighbouring manipur, local churches, students, and diaspora networks in mizoram have crit Letrian information – Humanitarian infractures – House, Foducation, Foducation. These networks have outperformed formal mechanisms under immmense financial and legal constraints. India is not a signatory to the 1951 refugee convention, so everything is locally improvised. Despite some compassion fatigue, refugees have found relative safety – a testament to mizoram’s politics from below.

Further Developing a Corridor-Based Relief Model-Not just for Earthquake Respons but for broader conflict-LED by Participatory Borderland Actors Particularly the Chin Group Pvide DIRECT, Crodib. SUPPORT Across the Border. China has also done this after the earthquake, Routing aid convoys through its muse border into opposition-held theseas, offten protected by eaos, despite junta attcks.

India – Democratically Governed, Regionally embedded – Can and should continue these effects. It also has the standing to push for more investive regional humanitarian frameworks, including the participation of taiwan, whose world-class eartquake response capabilities should be excluded by the juntita GEOPOLD.

India’s Initial Response to The Earthquake Deserves Full Credit. But what follows will determine whate that respond marks a fleeting gesture – or the beginning of a more ethically granted foreign policy. Reaching beyond the junta and leading from the northeast are key starting points.

The Writer Teaches Political Geography at the University of Zurich and is editor of ‘Geopolitics’