Until now, the far right has had little parliamentary weight in the EU’s political balance. It has been kept away from positions of responsibility by the central majority formed in the Parliament by the EPP, the Social Democrats (S&D, 140 seats) and the Renew liberals (102). It doesn’t help that its MEPs are scattered. Sixty-eight belong to the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, where the biggest delegations are Poland’s Law and Justice party (PiS, 24) and the Italians from Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (9). Fifty-eight sit in the Identity and Democracy (ID) group, such as the 23 MEPs of Italy’s Matteo Salvini’s League and the 18 French representatives of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National.

Others do not currently belong to any group, like the 12 Hungarian members of Fidesz, who were suspended and then expelled from the EPP in 2021 due to violations of the rule of law and of freedoms by Viktor Orban’s government.

Changing balances of power

At the end of the elections, MEPs from these parties alone could occupy a quarter of the Parliament’s seats, compared with 18% today. In tandem, the “grand coalition” that shapes the balance of the Parliament is likely to shrink – mainly due to the erosion of the Social Democrats and Liberals – but retain a majority. This shift in balance could prompt the EPP to turn more to the right, at least on certain issues.

Seeking re-election after the June vote, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (EPP) has opened the door to cooperation, if not an alliance with ECR – a scenario that would be a major change. A collaboration with ECR “depends very much on the composition of the Parliament and who is in which group,” said von der Leyen on April 29 during a debate with seven other candidates from the main European parties. Conversely, she ruled out working with the ID group.

This distinction is not new. In the European Parliament, ECR holds a vice-presidency. It is more involved in parliamentary work and has already worked with majority parties on certain texts, whereas ID takes a more disruptive stance and is kept at arm’s length by a cordon sanitaire.

In addition, for the past year and a half, von der Leyen and Meloni have been displaying their good relationship and cooperation on migration policy, the key issue for all far-right parties. In the end, the options defended by the Italian prime minister have quickly become common ground with other large segments of the Parliament. Initially imagined by the EU, the policy of agreements with migrant transit countries has been intensified, a co-operation which materialized in the two leaders’ joint visits to Tunisia in the summer of 2023, and to Egypt, in March.

The outsourcing of asylum processing, inspired by the United Kingdom and promoted by Meloni, is now part of the program of Commission President von der Leyen’s party, the EPP. Symbolizing the importance the Italian leader attaches to European policy, Meloni announced on April 28 that she would be leading her party’s European election campaign herself.

A great diversity of positions

Would ECR MEPs be more “eurocompatible,” more “moderate” or even more willing to cooperate as part of an alternative majority than the ID group? On the rapidly changing scene of the far right in the EU, there is no sure answer. ECR is structured by parties in government (Fratelli d’Italia) or which have recently been in government (Poland’s PiS). But it now includes the Strasbourg representative of Eric Zemmour’s far-right Reconquête ! party, and gives pride of place to the virulent euroscepticism of the PiS.

The great diversity of positions on many issues among the ECR parties, which is reflected in our portrait gallery (also true for ID members), could complicate the option of greater alignment with the EPP.

Without waiting for the verdict of the ballot box, the two ECR and ID groups have entered into a competition to attract the largest possible number of future MEPs. Heavily courted, Hungary’s Fidesz party is tempted to join ECR, but this prospect is not a happy one within the group, some of whose members take a dim view of Orban’s closeness to Moscow. The extreme reluctance expressed by Sweden’s Charlie Weimers – his country’s accession to NATO was delayed by Budapest – is a case in point.

Against the backdrop of Moscow’s war with Ukraine, support for Kyiv and relations with Putin’s Russia are undoubtedly the most divisive issues on the right today. Will they complicate relations with the EPP? In Strasbourg and Brussels, after June 9, a possible change of alliance will still have to be worked out.

Photo credits: AFP, European nion, European Parliament, REUTERS, AP, Freddy Schinkel