On June 28, Iran held the first round of voting to elect a new President, necessitated by the death of Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May. Since neither of the top two candidates — 69-year-old cardiac surgeon Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist, and 58-year-old hardliner Saeed Jalili — won more than 50% of votes, they will face off in a run-off election on July 5.

What role does the President play in Iran’s hybrid theocratic-democratic system, and where do these two candidates stand on various issues?

What do terms like “reformist” and “hardliner” mean in Iranian politics?

The reformist-conservative (what Western media call “hardliner”) divide in Iranian politics has existed since the beginning of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the subsequent formation of the Islamic Republic. Even when Ayatollah Khomeini led the new republic, there were moderate ayatollahs or senior Shia leaders from within the religious establishment who were critical of his policies.

For instance, Ayatollah Shariatmadari challenged the notion of Wilayat al-Faqih or the rule of the jurist, which implied an important political and constitutional role for the Supreme Leader.

Festive offer

After Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, there was a tussle for succession between the conservatives and the reformists within the clergy. Similar tussles were seen in elections for Iran’s President as well.

During the period when the reformist Mohammad Khatami was President (1997-2005) there was some support for women and university students. He was followed in the presidency by hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-13) who was not from the clergy, but conservative nonetheless.

Subsequently, reformist Hassan Rouhani (2013-21) came to power, followed by Raisi (2021-24), who was considered a hardliner.

What views do the two candidates hold on major issues?

Pezeshkian has stated he will object to oppressive restrictions on women. Like previous reformers, he too wants a better relationship with the West, and believes that Iran’s isolation due to Western economic sanctions needs to be ended.

US sanctions against Iran go back to the early days of the Islamic Republic. Iran negotiated with the West to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPoA), or the Iran nuclear deal, in 2015. In exchange for certain limits on Iran developing nuclear weapons, the West agreed to ease some sanctions.

Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the deal in 2018 dealt a blow to the reformists, and served as vindication for the conservatives who were opposed to the outreach to the West. The killing of the senior Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in 2020 by the United States further consolidated the conservative hold on power in Iran.

Pezeshkian is also arguing for more liberal policies, but that’s not easy to achieve.

Jalili had been part of Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the West, but his statements during the campaign suggest that he is no longer in favor of a deal. He believes that represents an unacceptable concession, and instead favors continuing with the “resistance economy” of asserting economic independence as resistance to sanctions.

Jalili also supports closer relations with China and Russia. He is part of one of the higher bodies of Iranian politics and security, the Expediency Council, indicating his proximity to the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

How are the presidential candidates selected?

Many people apply to become candidates but the establishment oversees the selection process, and only vetted candidates can contest. Most candidates are from the establishment, and only a few reformists can enter the fray.

The Supreme Leader has been indirectly critical of Pezeshkian’s position on improving relations with the US. However, these elections are taking place in the aftermath of tumultuous events like the 2022 women’s protests, and the position taken by the reformist candidate has a certain resonance.

What is the real extent of the President’s power in Iran?

The final arbiter in the Iranian system is the Supreme Leader, and the President has to negotiate all major policy decisions with him.

The President’s position in Iran can be compared to that of a Vice President elsewhere. While he does have a certain amount of executive power and some leeway in the day-to-day running of the system, broader policymaking must be in line with the overall ideology of the republic, and depends upon the President’s negotiating capabilities with the Supreme Leader. .

President Ahmadinejad ensured Iran asserted itself in regional politics, and extended assistance to the Lebanese Shiite militant group Hezbollah. And the reformist President Khatami proposed the idea of ​​a “dialogue among civilizations”, instead of the doctrine of a fundamental incompatibility with the West.

How could the outcome of the election influence Iran’s immediate foreign policy? Could there be shifts in the relationship between Iran and India?

Iran has important stakes in the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. It backs both Hamas and Hezbollah, with whom the Israelis are in conflict.

Under a hardline President, much of the policy direction seen under President Raisi may continue. A moderate President may try to negotiate things, but there’s a limit to it, especially during crises.

For the short term, not much is expected to change even if the reformist candidate is elected. There may be some negotiations later, although the Supreme Leader runs a major part of foreign policy.

Tehran’s relationship with New Delhi is not affected by Iran’s domestic ideological and political struggles. The two countries have ties rooted in history. After the Iranian revolution too, their relationship was not impacted negatively. In fact, Iran increased its engagements with India and non-aligned countries, in line with its opposition to the West.

Some dents appeared in the relationship because of global events. The Iranian economy was suffering with the expansion of US sanctions, which impacted the Chabahar port project, an important aspect of bilateral ties. The project was first discussed under the reformist Khatami in 2002, but was brought back on track under the hardliner Raisi, signifying a continuity regardless of ideology.

What does the low voter turnout — around 40%, the lowest since the revolution — suggest?

While it does not mean total citizen apathy towards politics, many Iranians do seem to believe that even electing a liberal President would not translate into the major policy changes they want. There is a class aspect to the ideological divide: poorer Iranians usually benefit from a conservative regime, while the liberals, middle class, and city-dwellers are more attracted to the reformists.

The low turnout does suggest an overall despondency, and that Iranians believe their political voice is not bringing the transformation they want, including relief from economic sanctions and greater freedoms for citizens. But more people could come out in the run-off vote.

Ramakrishnan recently retired as a Professor at the Center for West Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University’s School of International Studies. He is the author of US ‘Perceptions of Iran: Approaches & Policies’ (2008). He spoke to Rishika Singh.