Seventy countries went to the polls in 2024. One thread linked the results of all the elections. The electorate voted against the incumbent leadership. In some countries, notably the USA and the UK, the ruling party was turfed out of office. In others like France and Japan, the leadership returned to power with a reduced mandate. Many commentators have provided an explanation for this wave of anti-incumbency. Some have added economic slowdown, others inflation, still others social media-induced polarization and public anger. They are all correct. The explanation lies in a mix of these factors. What is uncertain is whether these factors capture fully the drivers behind this public reaction. Is this mood change an “aberrant moment in time” (President Joe Biden’s comment regarding President Trump’s first term) or something structural and longer-lasting?

On the international front, the rules of engagement defined by the West after World War II are in tatters. This is manifest in the resurgence of pseudo-imperial and territorial atavism. President Putin reportedly wants to recreate “Imperia Rus”, the kingdom of East Slavic states united by King Vladimir of Kiev in the 10th century. President Xi Jinping appears not to be interested in China taking “center stage” as the Middle Kingdom. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is manic about the idea of ​​”Greater Israel” in which there is no place for a Palestinian state. President Erdogan, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Assad dynasty in Syria, is rumored to harbor ambitions of extending Turkey’s regional sphere of influence — a la the Ottoman Empire — and President-elect Trump wants to “make America Great again”.

What does all this augur? A return to modernist feudalism, the resurgence of Cold War antagonisms albeit with an expanded cast of adversaries? A step-by-step, unintended but potentially catastrophic conjoining of loosely connected ambitions to create the perfect storm of a global conflict?

The global economy is shrouded in similar uncertainty. The year ended with slowing growth rates, increased protectionism, rising public debt, erratic monetary policy and Trump’s predictably unpredictable pronouncements on trade, taxes, technology, payment systems, alliances and immigration. The question is which button will he push. The answer must await the settling down of his administration but even then the direction of change will most likely be unclear. As will the ramifications.

The Green Energy transition has acquired significance because of global warming. The word “transition” can, however, be misleading. It signals the substitution of one embedded energy system with another. History would suggest, however, that this is an elusive objective.

The world has undergone two energy transitions — wood to coal in the 18th century and coal to oil in the 20th. Both were driven by technology, competitiveness and convenience. Neither led to the displacement of one energy source by another. What happened was a flip in market shares. Coal displaced wood in the 19th century and oil displaced coal in the 20th as the dominant energy source. The “transitions” were, in other words, “additive “not substitutive”.

Technology has made renewable energy competitive and accessible and brought about the necessary conditions for increasing the market share of solar and wind in the energy consumption basket. It has not, however, removed the blockers to ensure their dominance. Three blockers create uncertainty about the pace and extent of the green energy transition. First, structural. The shift from an embedded energy system built around fossil fuels to a new system based on green energy requires massive redesign and rebuild — and decades. Second, finance. The resources needed to finance this redesign/rebuild run into trillions of dollars. No one entity can meet this requirement. The only way these amounts can be mobilized is through the joint working of public, private and multilateral institutions to devise innovative funding mechanisms. And three, politics. The phasing down, let alone the phasing out, of fossil fuels will trigger economic and social consequences. Elected leaders are, therefore, wary of treading down this path.

Global warming requires the current transition to be “substitutive” not “additive”. The uncertainty is whether this is feasible. And if not, what would be the consequences?

Technology presents possibly the most worrying uncertainty. Few challenge the assertion that technological innovation has radically altered our lives. Few wish to place a block on further technological progress. That said, there are questions. Might the creator of “human competitive intelligence” lose control over his creation? What protocols should be put in place to safeguard against such (imagined?) risks? What are the ethical /human ramifications of AI /AIG, robotics, quantum computing and genetic engineering? How should the lines of accountability be defined? The best and brightest are engaged in a vibrant debate but as yet there is no clarity.

Polycritical uncertainties require global polycentric institutions. This is a heavy ask. But as the Greek philosopher Epictetus said, “We cannot choose our external circumstances, but we can always choose how we respond to them”. In simpler terms, the global community should create multidisciplinary institutions and respond to these uncertainties collectively.

The writer is chairman and Distinguished Fellow, Center for Social and Economic Progress